There is a very important book titled "The Guardians of the Republic: Anatomy of the Military Economy in Egypt" by Dr. Yazid Saig, a former professor of Middle Eastern studies in the War Studies Department at King's College London. He states in the book: "There is no detailed financial data published for the public regarding the revenues of the military institution and its annual reports... Egyptian governments avoid disclosing details about military spending and revenues."
The fools think that all this is a secret plan, while the "United" company launched a group of content creators on YouTube and TikTok who do not understand at all what defense industries mean, and told them: "Go to the EDEX exhibition and showcase your country." They truly showcased their country. A scene of utter absurdity. The fools do not want to see that there are no secret plans whatsoever, rather the "only secret plan" is directed against you, you unaware fool!
Because if they spoke frankly, it would be revealed that they manage a massive economic empire that has left military manufacturing aside and occupied itself with consumer industries like washing machines, refrigerators, construction, and consumer goods to compete with private companies. Thus, the damage has multiplied: they have neither met the military needs of the state, nor allowed civil sector companies to work, produce, profit, and expand in the region.
From my personal point of view, I do not see that Egypt should take Turkey as a model for defense industries, but rather it should consider South Korea. Why?
Simply because Turkey succeeded through a radical change in thought and management that I consider nearly impossible in Egypt – at least for the time being. The change there represented in the military exiting management, the entry of civilian technocrats, and linking industry directly to foreign policy.
However, in Egypt, the situation is completely different. The army is a key economic player, and this is a fact that will not change anytime soon. But we can think about how to employ this reality, as South Korea did – or perhaps Pakistan, which may be closer to our situation.
We have Israel on our borders, and South Korea has North Korea on its borders. We have fought wars, and Korea has too. Of course, this is a significant simplification that requires further detailing, but it suffices now to clarify that Turkey's conditions are not like ours at all. I will leave this matter for later elaboration.
Let us move to a comparison between defense industries in Egypt and Korea. I am not saying that they manufacture this and that while we do not, but I want to focus on the most important factor, in my opinion, that has made a difference between the two experiences. Therefore, we will look at the period from 2005 until today.
We will try to understand how a completely poor country emerged from the Korean War to become one of the world's largest arms exporters, while a country like Egypt, with its size and strength, still relies today on importing most of its weapons and uses its military factories to produce civilian goods like pasta and electrical appliances?
(Excuse me, electronic committees, this is the words of the researchers themselves, not my words, and I do not mock you.)
The answer to this question is not related to technical efficiency or the number of engineers, but lies – in my opinion – in the shape of bodies, management, and governance.
And during my research in the structure of Egyptian institutions related to defense industries, I got lost, and I no longer knew where each path leads.
A quick glance at the situation of both countries clearly shows that Korea undertook a radical transformation in the field of defense industries, while Egypt remained in a military economic internal model that serves the army first and the local civil market second.
Let us look into the details, and it will become evident what I want to point out.
The Korean model can be summarized in three basic pillars:
Central Mind – Research and Development Machine – Private Companies.
Since 2006, South Korea has established the DAPA – Defense Acquisition Program Administration, which is a civil technocratic body affiliated with the Ministry of Defense. This body acts as the central mind for everything related to defense industries in the country: planning acquisitions, developing products, managing exports, and ensuring quality. All of these are civilian, not military.
Under the DAPA umbrella, there is another body called ADD – Agency for Defense Development, which specializes in long-term research and development (R&D). This body connects the military with universities and private companies through projects known in economics as Mission-Oriented Projects, including missile development, radars, and smart munitions.
In short, Korea viewed defense as primarily an export technological project, not as an internal secret box for the army. Major private companies such as Hanwha, LIG Nex1, and KAI are the executive arms of this Korean project. These are publicly listed companies, exporting tanks, artillery, and advanced guidance systems, and linking their military innovations with the civil market, which generates what is known as Spin-off Technology, meaning the state profits twice: once from using technology in the military sphere, and once again when applied in civil sectors.
With this model, Korean arms exports reached $14 billion in 2023, and Korea became one of the top ten arms exporters globally, with massive contracts with Poland and countries in Asia and Latin America.
All of this was achieved grâce to decision-making and institutional centralization, the existence of private companies, and civilian leadership.
However, if we look at Egypt, we will find the picture completely reversed. There is a multitude of bodies, an army economy deeply entangled in civil sectors, whereas Korea has a civil economy that penetrates military sectors. And of course, the role of private companies is absent.
From 2005 until today, the Egyptian defense industry has been vast and decentralized, spread among the Ministry of Military Production (National Authority for Military Production), the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), the Armament Authority in the Ministry of Defense, and the National Service Projects Organization. All of them are military or quasi-military bodies, and there is no unified civilian body like DAPA that connects production to export or manages research and development projects centrally.
And perhaps – as some say – this is concealed "to surprise the enemy"
In Egypt, the military economy has aggressively expanded within the civil market. Before 2011, about 40% of the output of the Ministry of Military Production and 70% of the output of the Arab Organization for Industrialization was civil! Imagine that number! We are talking here about electrical appliances and construction equipment. This number increased later. After 2013, the army entered new sectors like food, infrastructure, and construction. And of course, they no longer talk about the ratio of civil to military production, so that we do not hear voices coming from the official trumpet.
In Egypt, there exists a military economic empire, but fundamentally it is a civil industries empire.
At the same time, the private civilian sector is not allowed to enter military manufacturing.
The private sector is effectively excluded. There are no true partnerships, nor is there a clear framework that allows it to enter defense supply chains, and military exports are very modest – about $40 million annually according to estimates by the SIPRI Center, compared to the massive imports.
The figure is truly embarrassing. Korea reached $14 billion, and Turkey about $7 billion. By God, were it not for my respect for you, I would have said something inappropriate and should not be said!
As for diversifying arms sources (Rafale, MiG, and potential deals with China or Turkey), it has only occurred at the procurement level, not at the level of governance and management structure. The focus is still internal, and military industrial capacity is directed toward a weakly value-added local civil market, not toward innovation or global export.
The problem, then, is not in intentions, and we do not hold anyone accountable for them, but in management and governance. We are speaking with numbers and logic, not emotions. The problem is not in the number of engineers, nor in human efficiency, nor in nationalism, nor in good intentions. All that is there. The problem lies in the shape of management, governance, and role distribution between the army, the state, and the private sector.
The difference that no one wants to address is the transparency of the industrial structure itself.
Korea opened its doors to the world to build a real industry, while Egypt closed them because the will is simply not there.
Although there lies a huge profit opportunity, but realizing it requires giving up the interests of some beneficiaries from the current situation in the production of household appliances and pasta and other civil sectors.
Will you choose the interests of individuals or the interests of the state and national security?
You at the Ministry of Defense know well that defense industries are not just "weapons factories", but a management system and institutional structure determining whether you will be a state exporting technology or a consumer of weapons and producer of cheap civil goods.
And this is a political decision related to governance, not to the budget, nor to the idea that we are "too poor".
This is an AI-generated English translation. The original text is in العربية
PhD Researcher in Defense Contracting and Cooperation Policies
